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SOCIAL SCIENTISTS AND 
FARM POVERTY ON THE 
NORTH AMERICAN PLAINS, 
1933~1940 
HARRY C. McDEAN 
Chronic farm poverty in the Great Plains dur-
ing the Great Depression of the 1930s provoked 
sharply differing responses from the govern-
ments of the United States and Canada. Among 
the many features of American and Canadian 
life that helped shape those different responses, 
the most significant was the status of the social 
sciences in agriculture. In nearly every category 
one might employ to assess their comparative 
status, from funding to publication record to 
political influence, social scientists in the 
United States enjoyed an impressive advantage 
over those in Canada by 1930 .. A historical 
appraisal of one element in this disparity-the 
research and the political influence of social 
scientists who worked in the field of chronic 
farm poverty-will help explain, at least in part, 
why the two countries pursued different strate-
gies toward chronic farm poverty in the Great 
Plains. 
Harry C. McDean is associate professor of 
history at San Diego State University. He has 
published articles in Red River Valley Historical 
Review, North Dakota History, and Agricultural 
History. 
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ORIGINS OF THE Two POLICIES 
To a great extent, the policies of the United 
States in the thirties flowed. from federal 
bureaus staffed by politically influential social 
scientists who had done extensive research 
during the preceding decade in the Great Plains 
and in other agricultural regions where there 
was a high incidence of impoverished farmers. 
In Canada, on the other hand, the social scien-
tists in agriculture were not nearly as influen-
tial, and when they did wield some political 
clout, their recommendations stemmed from 
research conducted during the depression itself 
and not from research during the far more 
prosperous period of the 1920s, as was the case 
with the American social scientists. 
In other words, those Canadian social scien-
tists who could influence policies studied a 
. different group of impoverished Great Plains 
farmers. When the Americans probed the 
sources of chronic farm poverty during the 
boom times of the 1920s, they were dealing 
with a population that appeared incapable of 
adjustment to an economy undergoing the 
normal stresses that were assumed to be part 
of the processes of agricultural and industrial 
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modernization. On the other hand, the Cana-
dians, carrying out their research during the 
Great Depression, viewed all impoverished 
farmers as victims of the depression and the 
drought and therefore could not identify those 
farmers who were incapable of adjusting to a 
modernizing economy, if indeed they even 
thought of that possibility. 
The impoverished group of Canadian Great 
Plains farmers presented their social scientists 
with some special probl~ms. For example, the 
Canadian group contained many more recent 
migrants with rural European backgrounds. 1 
This fIrst-generation immigrant group may have 
misled the Canadian social scientists, who con-
cluded that they were not "Canadian" and were 
accustomed to a different, peasant style of life 
-even preferred it. Thus, the argument ran, 
they should be allowed to follow their prefer-
ences until they or their progeny expressed a 
desire to assimilate and become "Canadian.,,2 
The American social scientists, by contrast, 
faced in America's southern plains an im-
poverished group, the "Okies," 98 percent of 
whom were white, Anglo-saxon, Protestant, and 
native-born. American social scientists could 
not therefore dub them foreigners whose back-
ground bred a preference for a lower-class life-
style. Instead, they had to deal squarely with 
features of their lives that resulted in chronic 
impoverishment.3 
Even though the "Okies" and the European 
immigrants in Canada suggested different re-
search avenues, the approach of the social 
scientists was affected to a much greater extent 
by the general conditions of the times in which 
they conducted their research. The twenties 
were a period of incredible largess for the 
American agricultural social scientists who had 
pioneered the fIeld in the years before World 
War I. Suddenly they found themselves in 
charge of heavily funded private research insti-
tutions and directing major federal and state 
bureaus for agricultural research. Of the private 
groups, probably the most signifIcant was the 
American Farm Economics Association. Of 
the public bureaus, the most important was the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) in 
the United States Department of Agriculture. 
During the twenties, it was common for the 
leadership in the former to be identical with 
the directors of the latter. 
U. S. SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 
During the early twenties the most influen-
tial founder of the Farm Economics Associa-
tion, Dr. Henry C. Taylor of the University 
of Wisconsin, was also the chief of the BAE. 
Taylor and these agencies deeply influenced 
the course of social science research on impov-
erished farmers in the American Great Plains. 
Taylor's farm background, his university 
training, and his professional research instilled 
in him a strong bias against those who were 
chronic failures at farming. He believed these 
people represented the "degenerative" element 
in the American amalgam-a group whose 
inferiorities retarded the march of the modern 
reforms that he and other social scientists en-
visioned for rural America. Indeed, Taylor and 
many of his colleagues feared that without the 
careful planning they intended to provide for 
the modern American farmer, the American 
countryside might turn into a "dumping 
ground" for degenerative Americans.4 
Taylor's bias might not have been important 
were it not that his publications, carrying this 
message, were widely read by social scientists 
who did research in the Great Plains. Then too, 
Taylor's writings dominated university class-
rooms, and he personally trained many grad-
uate students who researched the plains in the 
twenties and became architects of New Deal 
agricultural policies in the thirtie~.S They in-
Clude M. L. Wilson, who headed various federal 
and state research teams in the plains during 
the twenties and went on to become Secretary 
Henry A. Wallace's chief architect of USDA 
policy in the Great Plains during the 1930s; 
Lewis C. Gray, perhaps the most notable of the 
nation's land economists in the twenties and a 
major consultant to every New Deal agency 
operating in the plains during the thirties; John 
D. Black and Howard R. Tolley, whose research 
in the twenties directly influenced all phases 
of New Deal planning in the plains during the 
thirties; Oliver E. Baker, O. C. Stine, Charles 
Galpin, and other social scientists whose re-
search bore heavily on Great Plains policy 
during the thirties. 
While there can be little doubt that the pre-
vailing climate of racism and xenophobia in 
America during the twenties affected the 
views of these social scientists, Taylor himself 
was a strong influence during the formative 
period of their careers.6 Indeed, each was em-
ployed by Taylor during the twenties when he 
headed the BAE. It was during this period that 
the BAE initiated the nation's first in-depth 
examination of chronic rural farm poverty 
carried out by teams of professionally trained 
social scientists. 
In 1924 the BAE formally launched this 
research under the direction of M. L. Wilson. 
Chairman of the Department of Agricultural 
Economics at Montana State College in Boze-
man, Wilson was brought into the BAE to head 
its Division of Farm Management. Taylor hand-
picked Wilson partly because he had been one 
of his top graduate students but also because 
Wilson had directed social science research 
teams that had investigated the causes of farm 
success and failure on Montana's plains. wil-
son's research in the northern plains confirmed 
Taylor's views. 
In essence, Wilson's work provided a set of 
character promes of farmers who settled in the 
plains of Montana. These promes were exhaus-
tive in volume and detail, and can only be sum-
marized here. According to Wilson, there were 
many "shotgun farmers" who rushed onto 
Montana's plains in the prewar years. Com-
prising perhaps one-half of the settlers, most 
abandoned their farms with the drought that 
came during the war or when grain prices fell 
sharply after 1920. The majority were towns-
people in the grasp of a speculative mood that 
led them to believe they could make fast 
money farming the northern plains. Ignorant 
of modern dry-farming techniques, they quick-
ly abandoned their properties when their soils 
became less productive. Left behind were 
thousands of farmers of considerable experience 
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FIG. 1. M. L. Wilson in a stand of Montana 
wheat, 1915. M. L. Wilson Collection, Mon-
tana State University Archives, Bozeman, Mont. 
who now had to contend with such problems 
as soil blowing and thistle infestations caused 
by the "shotgun farmers." Wilson found that 
some experienced farmers contended with these 
problems better than others, and he made an 
effort to distinguish these farmers from one 
another by developing a system to measure 
their level of success. Employing graphics to 
distinguish these levels-pictures of the homes, 
modern conveniences, machinery, buildings, 
farm journals, and the like-Wilson attempted 
to delineate distinctive classes of farmers. 7 
Wilson's own upbringing no doubt persuaded 
him to employ material possessions as signs of 
farming success. Born and raised on a middle-
class farm in Iowa, he was convinced that 
success in farming brought with it many of the 
material benefits and conveniences that might 
be found in the home of a similarly successful 
town resident. The large home he grew up in 
contained accouterments indicative of his 
family's alertness to innovation and change, for 
his parents subscribed to many farm journals 
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FIG. 2. Huge wheat harvesting machinery in use in Montana in 1938. Such technological 
developments demonstrated that a decreasing number of farmers were needed on the Great 
Plains. M. L. Wilson Collection, Montana State University Archives, Bozeman, Mont. 
and magazines that reported new techniques in 
farm practice and recent developments in agri-
cultural science and technology. 8 
Wilson's research identified only a small 
percentage of plains farmers in Montana whose 
residences matched the standards of success he 
envisioned. In a huge area-of Montana, nearly 
three-quarters fell below the middle-class stan-
dard that Wilson employed. Yet some of the 
farmers in this group showed signs that they 
were alert to innovation and to change in agri-
culture: they subscribed to modern farm 
journals; they· knew of recent developments in 
farm management, technology, and science; and 
many attended Montana State College's exten-
sion courses. Clearly, they could be called 
"progressive farmers," even though they fell 
below middle-class standards.9 
Wilson concluded that these progressive 
farmers would be unable to take advantage of 
their abilities until substantial reforms were 
enacted in the plains economy. Included among 
these needed changes was the exit from Mon-
tana's agriculture of those poor farmers who did 
not exhibit the alertness required for successful 
farming in the plains. The most obviously 
necessary reforms were the consolidation of 
small farm units and the mechanization of 
operations on these lar~er units. Wilson argued 
that careful research by farm management ex-
perts was needed to determine the sizes of 
farms requisite for successful farming in each 
area, but it was clear that until farm expansion, 
consolidation, and mechanization were carried 
forward, only a small percentage of Montana's 
farmers could expect to rise to a level of living 
envisioned by Wilson as "standard.,,10 
These conclusions recommended Wilson to 
Taylor because, by 1924, Taylor was concerned 
that even the alert, progressive farmer might 
vanish from the countryside without consider-
able reforms. Taylor asked Wilson to head a 
nationwide study of "pathological farming 
areas" -an ostensibly clinical tepm adopted 
by Taylor's social scientists for its evocation 
of concepts of disease and abnormality.l1 
The studies that Wilson's division began in 
1924 were carried out in cooperation with 
social scientists employed by the experiment 
stations, extension services, and agricultural 
colleges. Taylor and Wilson identified regions in 
the Southwest, the Red River Valley, and the 
Great Plains that they labeled "pathological 
farming areas." Then they reached cooperative 
research agreements with state agricultural 
research institutions in these regions. The 
BAE agreed to fund social scientists whose re-
search projects would (1) provide a profile of 
the progressive farmer in their area; (2) examine 
the economic status of the progressive farmer, 
taking pains to compare his material possessions 
with those of progressive farmers who resided 
outside of the "pathological farming area"; 
(3) provide a proHle of the unprogressive farm-
er in the pathological area, paying particular 
attention to his current farm practices and, 
especially, to his awareness of and receptivity 
to modern information systems in farm man-
agement and agricultural technology. 12 
This research program of the BAE heavily 
influenced the formation of American farm 
policy during the New Deal period. Its greatest 
impact was on New Deal policy in the Great 
Plains. In this region, most of the bulletins, 
circulars, pamphlets, journal articles, and 
books that resulted from the research project 
could be distilled into a simple message: a 
heavy out-migration of the poor, unprogressive 
farmers was the foundation upon which to 
build any sensible federal policy for agriculture 
on the plains.13 
The need for this out-migration was simple 
enough to understand. Researchers showed 
that regardless of a farmer's individual abilities, 
if he worked a farm that was "submarginal" 
in the pathological farming area, he was bound 
to live in poverty. The definition of a "submar-
ginal farm" varied greatly even within small 
areas of the plains. But the social scientists 
utilized a set of related conditions, such as 
climate, soil type, fertility, farm size, compara-
tive capitalization costs, and the farm's suit-
ability for raising commodities that could be 
produced at costs competitive with those grown 
in other regions, in order to determine for each 
particular area what could be an above-marginal 
operation. Such a composite picture of super-
marginal farming operations provided the basis 
for the reform policies that these social scien-
tists advocated in the Great Plains. 
Their research also indicated that there were 
farmers with a progressive profile who nonethe-
less lived on submarginal farms. These poor 
farmers were attentive to information systems 
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of the social scientists, but they could not fully 
exploit that information to uplift themselves 
because large numbers of submarginal, unpro-
gressive farmers checked their advance. In Okla-
homa, for example, the researchers found that 
unprogressive farmers moved about annually 
from one submarginal farm to another. This 
horizontal class movement tended to perpetu-
ate the submarginal farming system in the 
plains regions of that state. It prevented the 
progressive farmers from enlarging their own 
operations and also exhausted the soil. Should 
this trend continue, it would overwhelm any 
efforts to establish above-marginal operations 
in these pathological farming areas.14 
Indeed, subsequent research revealed that 
many of the difficulties in the southern plains 
stemmed from the problem of itinerant workers 
who used their submarginal farms as way sta-
tions in their endless search for nonagricultural 
work. 15 Although this trend was not apparent 
to the researchers in the twenties, they did 
pinpoint the detrimental role played by the 
unprogressive farmer in the pathological farm-
ing regions of the Great Plains. 
NEW DEAL PLAINS POLICY 
This research and the conclusions it sug-
gested bore heavily on the thoughts of the 
social scientists who found themselves in a 
position to shape federal farm policy in the 
Great Plains during the New Deal period, 
from 1933 to 1940. Social scientists who had 
led research teams in the Great Plains during 
the twenties, such as M. L. Wilson, Howard R. 
Tolley, and Lewis C. Gray, were thrust into 
national prominence during the New Deal 
period and were entrusted with formulating 
USDA policy in the plains. They responded by 
creating the Northern and Southern Great Plains 
councils. They charged the two plains councils 
with the task of sponsoring programs that 
aimed to define "areas which should remain in 
cultivation but where changes in cultural treat-
ment and farming systems should be put into 
effect; areas where increases in the size of farms 
are needed; areas that should be used primarily 
22 GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY, WINTER 1983 
for grazing with some farming in combination; 
areas which should be used only for grazing, 
forests, wildlife, recreation, or a combination 
of these." Once this was accomplished, the 
committees should establish "cultural practices 
and systems of farming which should be fol-
lowed ... in each problem area which is to be 
retained in cultivation, and to analyze existing 
and possible new state legislation with respect 
to conservancy districts, rural zoning, coopera-
tive grazing associations, assessment of taxation 
practices, state aids to local taxing jurisdic-
tions ... in order to determine their relation to 
the achievement of the results desired from a 
unified program." Finally, the New Dealers 
asked the committees to structure their pro-
grams politically so they would bring all state 
and federal agricultural programs under one 
bureaucratic umbrella. 16 
These instructions were designed to achieve 
the specific goals that the planners had had in 
mind for nearly a decade. Such a plan, they 
believed, would remove soil-exhausted areas of 
the plains from cultivation, to be revitalized by 
soil-building grasses. Lands that were fertile 
would be zoned for the production of agricul-
tural commodities that would be soil-conserving 
and suited to the region's farm economy. Small 
farms would be phased out by government 
programs that would encourage their sale to 
farmers and to cattlemen who needed addi-
tional acreage to make operations profitable 
and soil-conserving. 
The achievement of this goal would pro-
foundly alter the farm economy in some areas 
in the plains, while others that already had 
initiated suitable reforms would be affected 
less directly by the program. In the high plains 
of eastern Colorado, for example, more than 
half of the fertile farms would have to increase 
in size to at least 1,180 acres; while in south-
western Nebraska, where most farms already 
averaged 400 acres, few would need enlarge-
ment to be profitable. To encourage the crea-
tion of larger farms and to remove eroded soils 
from cultivation, the government would need 
to purchase an estimated 31 million acres of 
fa~m land in the plains, mostly in the southern 
region. Of this acreage, 24 million acres would 
be retired permanently from cultivation; the 
remainder would be sold to farmers needing to 
expand operations.17 
This program of land retirement and farm 
adjustment would displace an estimated fifty 
thousand farm families still resident in the 
plains, who would require relocation and, pref-
erably, different occupations. The number 
who would be displaced varied by region, 
depending on the agricultural adjustments that 
already had been made. In some sections of 
North Dakota, where a large number of farms 
would have to be increased to an average size 
of 800 acres, about one-fifth of the farm popu-
lation would need to find different work. By 
contrast, where suitably sized farms generally 
had been established, as in the plains of north-
eastern Montana and southwestern Nebraska, 
as little as 7 percent of the farm population 
would be affected.18 
THE U.S. RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 
The Department of Agriculture's social 
scientists devised several plans to resettle the 
chronically poor plains farmers. They were con-
vinced that these farmers were by definition 
unprogressive, lacking the managerial talents 
necessary for success in modern farming. Thus, 
the central objective in each scheme was to 
divert them into occupational situations that 
did not require such talents. 
Although the social scientists recognized 
that this objective was critical to their plans, 
they encountered severe problems that pre-
vented them from achieving it. They contrived 
several schemes that sought to shift chronical-
ly poor farmers into situations that might 
permit them to earn decent incomes as wage 
workers. The first was the Subsistence Home-
steads Program, which operated from 1933 to 
1934. The second was the Resettlement Admin-
istration, which functioned from 1935 until 
it was absorbed by yet a third program, the 
Farm Security Administration, which served 
through the early years of World War II. 
The Subsistence Homesteads Program was 
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FIG. 3. A typical homestead house built by the USDA Division of Subsistence Homesteads, 
headed by M. L. Wilson. From the private collection of Harry C. McDean. 
the product of social scientists such as M. L. 
Wilson, Howard Tolley, and L. C. Gray. Con-
cerned that a heavy migration from the Great 
Plains would deplete the region of the popula-
tion base it needed for the development of 
modern community services, these men pro-
posed a plan designed to transform dislodged 
poor farmers into pools of readily available 
workers for the factories that would be encour-
aged to move into the Great Plains. This would 
be accomplished by moving the displaced farm-
ers into new rural towns that the federal 
government would build in strategic locations 
in the Great Plains. The social scientists calcu-
lated that industries would move into these 
new towns in order to take advantage of the 
lower overhead operating costs that such rural 
settings afforded them. 19 
In the fall of 1933, the Division of Subsis-
tence Homesteads, headed by M. L. Wilson, 
began to select sites for these new federal com-
munities. Because his division had an initial 
appropriation from the Congress of only $25 
million, Wilson was convinced that the first 
communities would have to be few in number 
and therefore could act only' as models for 
future developments in the plains. By early 
1934, Wilson had selected fourteen rural com-
munity sites in the Great Plains, and the con-
struction of facilities and the selection of 
settlers were under way by midyear.20 Wilson 
soon found, however, that his appeal for indus-
tries to decentralize into these locales fell on 
deaf ears. Although Ford Motor Company, 
B. F. Goodrich, and Studebaker each had ex-
pressed an interest in decentralization to Wil-
son during the twenties, they demonstrated 
no interest during depressed economic times.21 
The result was that when completion of the 
construction and settlement of the communi-
ties was reached in 1934 and 1935, not one 
industry had agreed to relocate. Wilson's entire 
division thus came under heavy attack and he 
was forced to resign. His division was abolished 
and the newly created Resettlement Adminis-
tration pursued a different plan. 
This new administration was headed by Rex-
ford Tugwell, a nationally recognized economist 
from Columbia University. Tugwell shared the 
views of Wilson and other plains social scientists 
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on the character defects of chronically poor 
farmers. He, too, believed that they must be 
resettled with the opportunity to become fac-
tory workers, but he doubted that industries 
were likely to decentralize into rural areas, 
especially in the plains regions that were far 
from established industrial and urban centers. 
He therefore urged that the poor, dispossessed 
plains farmers be moved great distances to 
existing centers of trade and commerce where it 
was realistic to expect that they might find 
work. Such was the program of the Resettle-
ment Administration. 22 
Hoping to provide such displaced farmers 
with federally constructed housing, Tugwell 
began to develop several suburban communi-
ties. Once housed in these suburbs, the new 
residents, Tugwell believed, could successfully 
locate jobs in nearby urban factories. 
Tugwell's plans were short-lived. In 1936 
his administration was severely criticized for 
lavish spending in the construction of the 
suburbs. In fact, the costs of individual homes 
in the new suburbs ran so high that some of 
Tugwell's critics claimed that anyone who pur-
chased them would need an executive's salary 
in order to make the necessary payments. 23 In 
any event, Tugwell was forced out of office 
and his administration was replaced by the 
Farm Security Administration in 1937. 
The FSA never developed a permanent plan 
to resettle the chronically poor plains farmers; 
its plans were of a more temporary nature. 
Recognizing that any long-term plans to help 
displaced, chronically poor farmers were de-
pendent upon industrial recovery in America, 
the FSA intended to soften the impact of prob-
lems faced by the dispossessed plains farmers 
until jobs became available for them in the in-
dustrial economy. Thus, the FSA organized 
migratory labor camps to provide way stations 
for the tens of thousands of "Okies" and 
"Arkies" who migrated from the plains to both 
urban and rural areas of the Far West. It also 
founded "communal farms," where some of 
these chronically poor displaced farmers could 
be resettled as agricultural laborers under the 
direction of skilled FSA farm management 
supervisors.24 Even so, these plans were not 
viewed as either fundamental or long-term. 
The main energies of the social scientists were 
directed toward achieving broad policies that 
would inspire industrial recovery and open 
great numbers of factory jobs to the emigrants 
from areas of chronic farm poverty. 25 
CANADIAN SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 
While American social scientists worked 
during the Great Depression to transform 
chronically poor plains farmers into factory 
workers, their Canadian counterparts planned 
to keep all of their poor plains farmers in the 
agricultural economy. Their research in plains 
farm poverty during the Great Depression led 
them to view all poor plains farmers as a group 
that was impoverished by unusual conditions of 
depression and of drought. They never sought 
to identify in this group a class of unprogres-
sive or chronically poor farmers. 
This distinction grew out of the compara-
tively elementary status of the agricultural 
social sciences in Canada. Whereas the social 
sciences in American agriculture grew up during 
the Progressive Era, in Canada their growth 
followed world War 1. In the University of Sas-
katchewan, for example, the Department of 
Farm Management was not organized until 
1926, and farm economics as a field of agri-
cultural specialization was not institutionalized 
in that university until the 1930s.26 
At this early stage in the development of the 
agricultural social sciences in the Canadian 
plains, it was difficult for social scientists to 
obtain funds for their research p;ojects. Thus, 
. their research programs were minuscule when 
compared with their counterparts in the United 
States. Nearly the entire body of agricultural 
social science research in Saskatchewan during 
the twenties was in the field of production 
costs. Yet not one of that province's research 
projects had a range of inquiry broad enough to 
explain how the comparative managerial 
abilities of different farmers affected their 
production costs and profits.27 This narrow 
focus may have come from the research interests 
of ·Professor William Allen, who pioneered pro-
duction cost studies in the plains and was 
chairman of the Department of Farm Manage-
ment in the University of Saskatchewan.28 But 
Allen's special interests provide only a partial 
explanation for the narrowness of social science 
research in the Canadian plains. 
During the twenties, Canada did not have a 
dominion bureau of agricultural economics. 
The institutionalization of this bureau in 
Canada's dominion government followed that 
in the United States by more than a decade, 
and thus, in the twenties, there was no do-
minion bureau staffed by professional farm 
economists with broad backgrounds that might 
have widened the range of research projects. 
Moreover, for want of such a bureau, no domin-
ion funds were available to researchers who 
might have wished to expand the range of social 
science research in the plains. 
Not until the Great Depression did funds 
from outside the provinces flow into the Cana-
dian plains to promote research in the agricul-
tural social sciences. Even then, most of the 
funding came not from Canadian sources but 
from either American or international research 
foundations. The most important research in 
the Canadian plains during the depression was a 
five-year project funded by the American Geo-
graphical Society and the Social Science Re-
search Council. 29 
Although the extensive publications from 
such projects helped create long-term farm 
adjustments in the Canadian plains, they were 
too late to be of much use during the Great 
Depression. Moreover, the social scientist 
authors achieved- professional acclaim too 
late for them to obtain positions of political 
influence comparable with those enjoyed by 
their counterparts in the United States during 
the depression. Not until the end of the depres-
sion did Canadian social scientists such as W. A. 
Mackintosh and G. E. Britnell win dominion-
wide acclaim for their penetrating research into 
Canadian plains agriculture.30 In Saskatchewan 
the Royal Commission on Immigration and 
Settlement had only one member who was a 
social scientist; the other members included a 
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court reporter, a lawyer, an insurance agent, 
and a farmer. 31 
POLICY OF CANADIAN 
SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 
When Canadian social scientists did help 
formulate plains policy, their approach to 
farm poverty differed substantially from that 
of the Americans. This was because- the Cana-
dians were dealing with the problems of a 
large group of plains farmers who appeared to 
be victims of drought and depression. The 
major research programs in Canadian plains 
agriculture in the thirties produced two classic 
studies: G. E. Britnell's The Wheat Economy 
and a multivolume study Charles Mackintosh 
edited, Canadian Frontiers of Settlement. 
These probed the causes of drought and of 
depression in the Canadian plains and offered 
judicious accounts of the economic and the 
geographic forces that left destitute a large 
percentage of the farmers of that region.32 Un-
like their American counterpart.s who had 
. examined farm poverty in the plains during a 
period of prosperity, Canada's social scientists 
encountered conditions of drought and of 
depression that led them away from class-
ifying their farmers according to ability. 
Since they did not try to arrange farmers 
into classes, they never considered plans de-
signed to relocate farmers who had become 
chronically impoverished because they were 
incapable of adopting management techniques 
essential to success in a modern agricultural 
economy. 
Canadian social scientists therefore never 
recommended programs designed to remove a 
. substantial portion of impoverished farmers 
permanently from agriculture. Yet in many 
other respects, Canadian social scientists sought 
agricultural reforms in the plains that were 
similar to those proposed by American re-
searchers. For example, the Canadian Prairies 
Rehabilitation Act was designed to accomplish 
the major conservation measures sought in the 
USDA's directives to the American Northern 
and Southern Great Plains councils.33 
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CANADIAN RESETTLEMENT PROGRAM 
The Canadian social scientists, unlike the 
Americans, believed that poor farmers who left 
the plains could be resettled as farmers else-
where in Canada. Thus they never sought to 
develop programs like the Subsistence Home-
steads Program, the Resettlement Administra-
tion, and the Farm Security Administration, 
all of which assumed that many contemporary 
farmers were misfits in modern agriculture and 
needed to be shifted into wage-earning occupa-
tions where they could be closely supervised. 
Canadian policy in the plains included re-
settlement programs that evolved from the 
belief that anyone with a background in farm-
ing had the potential to succeed in farming if 
given a fair chance. Commonly called the 
"Land Settlement Scheme," the Canadian plan 
included a variety of provincial and dominion 
loans and subsidies designed to help resettle 
plains farm families in Canadian areas generally 
north of the plains regions. These were newly 
defined settlement districts such as Loon Lake, 
Meadow Lake, Shand Creek, Carrot River 
Valley, and Shellbrook-Meath Park. Unofficial 
estimates reveal that by 1935 perhaps forty-five 
thousand Canadians were resettled in such dis-
tricts in northern Saskatchewan alone. 34 
In these districts, the settlers faced new 
problems that often overwhelmed them. Their 
farm animals died of a variety of diseases; their 
soil was too rocky and perennially wet; they 
were unable to adapt scientific techniques 
quickly enough to remain solvent; and even 
when such conditions were not present, their 
land holdings were far too small to produce a 
decent income. Hence in 1935 Saskatchewan 
established the Northern Settler's Re-establish-
ment Branch to provide settlers with more 
subsidies, with farm consultants, and often with 
I 35 repeated resett ement. 
No doubt these Canadian resettlement pro-
grams succeeded in helping poor Canadian 
plains farmers to relocate in regions where 
pioneer agricultural skills could be employed. 
Even so, such skills brought only poverty to 
those who practiced them. Surveys made toward 
the end of the thirties showed that most plains 
farmers who were resettled lived at or below 
levels they had experienced when they had 
farmed in the plains.36 
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF 
THESE SOCIAL SCIENTISTS 
The surveys suggest that Canadian policy 
toward the chronically poor plains farmer was 
less sagacious than that of the social scientists 
in the United States. Subsequent experience 
seemed to confirm the assumptions of the 
American social scientists that most chronical-
ly poor farmers would have to become urban 
workers in order to improve their condition. 
Still, the resettlement programs of America's 
social scientists could .claim only limited success 
in helping the chronically poor plains farmers 
make this transition, for less than 10 percent 
actually profited from their programs. 
If the success rate of the American policy 
was not truly significant, what, then, is the 
lasting importance of the social scientists who 
produced it? It is that their efforts encouraged 
the federal government to recognize that a 
respectable level of living in modern American 
agriculture was likely to be earned only by 
skilled and often professionally trained farm 
managers. The social scientists therefore helped 
shatter one of the most politically powerful 
myths in America. Their efforts made it diffi-
cult for America's government ever again to 
pursue policies that are based on the belief that 
anyone can move to a farm and live happily 
ever after. 
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